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GENETICALLY MODIFIED THEOLOGY: THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF 
PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY(1) 
 
 




The latest massive controversies about genetically modified (GM) crops and foods 
in the UK and mainland Europe have underlined the novelty and complexity of the 
human issues raised by advances in biotechnology. Not only have the 
controversies found governments like our own unprepared for the unprecedented 
surges in public hostility towards this emerging technology, but they have also 
suggested the extent to which dominant ‘expert’ opinion, which has 
overwhelmingly favoured reliance on ‘scientific’ safety assessments of GM 
products on an individual case-by-case basis, may have been missing the point. 
 
But what is the point? How are recent events to be understood? In this article, we 
want to argue that the current public anxiety about the genetic engineering of 
plants and animals has been radically misunderstood in a number of ways. First, 
when viewed on their own terms, public reactions can be seen as reasonable and 
sensitive rather than irrational and ‘emotional’. Second, they are better understood 
as responses at the level of ontology and theology rather than simply as concerns 
about physical risk and health. Third, whilst people are concerned about the 
technologies themselves, their deepest unease seems to be in relation to the spirit 
in which these technologies are being developed and encouraged - the motives 
that animate this development, the level of seriousness and respect with which it is 
proceeding, and the assumptions about human beings and their place in the world 
that seem to underlie it. 
 
The urgency of the need to develop a richer understanding of the dynamics of 
human responses to biotechnology cannot be doubted - the more so because, 
hitherto, such dimensions have been given only residual attention in countries like 
the UK. Genetic modification is a profoundly important technological process, for 
which huge scientific, political and economic expectations have been 
generated.(2) As fruits of the immense advances in molecular biology over the 
past three decades, such developments are claimed to have deep potential 
implications for future human welfare and development around the globe. Yet this 
potential will be nugatory if it is rejected by the human beings who are its 
supposed future beneficiaries. And the possibility of such rejection has been made 
credible for the first time by the continuing events in Europe. 
 
From the early 1970s, there has been recognition of the moral and ethical 
challenges posed by advances in biotechnology.(3) Countries like Britain have 
developed a patchwork of advisory committees (Advisory Commission on 
Releases into the Environment [ACRE], Advisory Commission on Novel Foods 
and Processes [ACNFP]) and so on, reflecting the agreed ‘precautionary’ 
approach prescribed in European Union member states. More recently, there has 
been a succession of reports and reviews by bodies such as the Royal Society, 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution. Overwhelmingly, such studies have focused on particular products and 
processes, either narrowly on questions of risk and safety, or more broadly on 
their moral acceptability. The core problem tends to be pictured as being how to 
arrive at adequate moral, ethical or even theological evaluations (which are seen, 
by implication, as soft, if socially very important, issues of judgment) of matters of 
scientific fact (which, by contrast, are purported to reflect hard and objectively 
specifiable ontological reality). 
 
In the present context, one immediately awkward implication of this approach is 
that it tends to give implicit support to an understanding of ‘the public’ which is in 
itself demeaning - and indeed thoroughly question-begging. If the task of moral, 
ethical and theological reflection comes to be seen as the provision of a distinctive 
form of ‘expert’ appraisal of developments in the physical-biological domain, then 
‘ordinary people’ who react against such developments in ways which appear to 
be at odds with approaches emanating from such expertise will tend to be 
pictured, by implication, as by contrast less than ‘expert’ - their reactions 
untutored, ‘emotional’ or even, in the worst case, ‘irrational’. Indeed, much 
‘informed’ comment on recent events, in news media and by politicians, has had 
this flavour. When the GM controversy erupted in Britain in early 1999, com-
mentators from all sides of the argument - politicians, leader-writers, and scientific 
institutions alike - sought to distinguish between supposedly ‘rational’ (i.e. 
scientifically or politically justified) concerns about GM developments, and those 
which are simply ‘hysterical’ or ‘media induced’. 
Our own approach has a different starting point. To understand the human 
dynamics now in play, there appears to us an urgent need to focus in a far more 
sensitive and discriminating fashion on the quality and texture of the actual 
reactions of ‘ordinary people’ themselves in relation to such matters. From a 
Christian perspective, this means focusing with empathic sensitivity - with what 
Simone Weil calls attention - on the integrity of what particular people are saying, 
singly and in groups, about their own reactions, both to the new GM issues, and to 
the ways in which such technological artefacts are now being handled by 
governments and regulatory bodies.(4) Respectful examination and interpretation 
of such reactions, we suggest, may offer insights into the deeper human 
significance of biotechnology’s current travails. 
 
It happens that research by the authors and their associates provides a body of 
raw material for such a task. In particular, the 1997 study at the Centre for the 
Study of Environmental Change, Uncertain World: Genetically Modified 
Organisms, Food and Public Attitudes in Britain, offers insight into the finer grain of 
a range of relevant public responses.(5) The material in question was generated 
through focus group discussions involving people from a spectrum of social 
classes and life stages, as part of an attempt in late 1996 and early 1997, well in 
advance of the recent upsets, to gain insight into then-latent concerns and 
anxieties about GM prospects and developments. 
 
A key finding from Uncertain World was the glaring gap between the often 
unspecific and inchoate character of ‘lay’ public concerns about biotechnology 
(‘Where is this leading?’; ‘Won't it lead to unanticipated problems, as has tended to 
happen with novel technologies on the past?’; ‘Who on earth can we trust in this 
post-BSE world?’; ‘What crucial, and by definition unspecifiable, unknowns are yet 
to be identified?’) and the hard-edged, one-issue-at-a-time, reductionist scientific 
assessments of the official political oversight bodies (ministerial advisory 
committees, scientific advisers, EU expert scientific panels, and so on). The sense 
of such a gap - and the understandable if largely unarticulated unease it 
engenders, even in individuals untutored in the nuances of constitutional political 
accountability - was all the more striking for the fact that at that stage (i.e. in early 
1997) there was no acknowledgement whatsoever by the powers-that-be that any 
such mismatch existed. The authors of Uncertain World concluded that the 
political legitimacy of the prevailing regulatory arrangements was probably highly 
brittle — a conclusion which appears now to have been vindicated by the turbulent 
GM events of 1999, and the associated bewilderment of the responsible regulatory 
bodies.(6) 
 
A corollary was that more useful analytical insights for interpreting the Uncertain 
World focus group discussions were found to be available more in the domains of 
the sociology of knowledge - particularly, recent insights concerning the social 
dynamics of contending conceptions of ‘scientific uncertainty’ and ‘public risk 
perceptions’ - than in more mainstream moral and ethical commentaries.(7) In 
other words, the concepts and vocabularies of ‘risk society’ and the recent social 
scientific understanding of human responses to contemporary cultural change 
turned out to help constitute more accurate ‘predictions’ of public responses than 
did the officially dominant tools of analysis.(8)(9) There are now signs, in the wake 
of the current brouhaha, that such insights are beginning to have an impact on 
public policy reflection.(10) 
 
Nevertheless, the Uncertain World focus group materials pointed to a host of 
further questions of a normative kind, not addressed in the study itself. It is these 
that provide a useful starting point for the present article. For example: In 
articulating their concerns about biotechnology developments (the same concerns 
left unaddressed within the official regulatory frameworks), what implicit picture of 
the human-nature relationship were people tacitly assuming? What tacit 
‘cosmology’, or even ‘ontology’, is being predicated? What accommodations with 
‘uncertainty’ were being assumed as normal, from which GM developments were 
intuited to be a departure? Were people really hostile to human-induced changes 
to the ‘natural’ world, or could the anxieties being expressed on this score be 
palliated if there was greater confidence in their overall political supervision? What 
normative model of the very notion of ‘rationality’ is appropriate when issues 
concerning human intervention in the very processes of life itself are at issue? 
 
As we argue below, questions of these kinds touch on deep issues concerning the 
nature of human personhood - indeed of human nature itself. It seems conceivable 
that the intensity of current controversies around genetically modified crops and 
foods arises in part from the fact that, in their regulation in the public domain, 
conflicting ontologies of the person are making themselves felt in the politics of 
everyday life. If this is the case, then Christian theological understandings of the 
person may be of central analytical significance for helping throw light on what has 
been going on. 
 
It is this intriguing possibility - that theological perspectives may now be 
indispensable in helping explain to largely secular institutions the sources and 
dynamics of conflicts now threatening to paralyse the development of what is 
being posited as a key technology for the twenty-first century - that we seek now to 
outline. In the next section we discuss relevant features of the Uncertain World 
focus group transcripts. This leads, in the third section, to a consideration of the 
ways in which prevailing strains of theological reflection have been considering 
broadly these same phenomena. And in the last section, we try to set out some of 
the challenges posed by our analysis, both for political institutions and for the role 
of theology itself. 
 
II. The Nature of Public Concerns 
1999 has been a year of immense controversy around Europe concerning GM 
food and agricultural products. Yet, in Britain at least, the outlines of tensions 
resulting in such upheavals were evident in qualitative research undertaken three 
years previously, in 1996-1997, as part of the study published as Uncertain World. 
Focus groups involving people from a variety of social groups and life stages 
provided the framework for an exploration of public views, actual or emergent, 
about GM prospects, as well as a basis for subsequent comparisons with official 
responses.(11) 
 
In the research, the single most recurrent source of unease to emerge concerned 
the issue of tampering. At one level, GM developments were felt to be yet another 
stage in intensifying patterns of industrial interference with the ‘natural’ character 
of foods: 
 
M:       It sounds dangerous and unnatural ... I get the impression that all the food’s 
been meddled with in a laboratory before it reaches the supermarket . . . It's 
like, you know, these fruits they inject with stuff to keep apples redder for 
longer and things. I want food to be fresh. I don't want it to have all this stuff 
in it ... But that's like scientifically taking natural food and making it 
unnatural. 
T:        ... they're going to do a lot more messing about and I don't know why they 
don't just miss that bit out and hurry up and make three pills, breakfast, 
dinner and tea. We'd all have a lot less to worry about (laughter) . . . You 
get shades of Adolf Hitler, you know, you get the supreme fruit and veg ... 
(North London Working Mothers group) 
 
But beyond this, GM crops and foods seemed to point to a qualitatively new phase 
in interference with nature itself: 
 
R:         It's messing about with nature, isn't it? I'm not sure if that's a good or bad 
thing . . . That's it. Tampering with nature. What damage is it going to do? 
They're messing around with nature like that, what damage is it going to do 
to the environment? In twenty or thirty years' time? I mean, maybe you 
won't be able to grow your own vegetables then. Because of the damage to 
the ozone layer or something like that. . . 
(North London ‘Green Consumers’ group) 
 
J: When I look at it I think oh, they're dabbling in nature aren’t 
they? You read scientific developments, that jumps out at me, 
scientific developments . . . You think, well they’re trying to, 
you know, genetically change things and all this, well what 
are they putting in it to genetically change it? 
(Lancashire Working Women group) 
 
M:       It doesn't seem natural... for man to interfere with the nature of things. I 
know processes of evolution, everything goes through changes, sometimes 
for the better, sometimes for the worse, but I’m not sure whether man 
should play God and change things for better, for the lucre at the end of the 
day … 
 (Lancashire ‘Risk Takers’ group) 
 
Strong as such concern was, however, it was less than absolute. Many people 
were prepared to discriminate between different potential uses of GMs, according 
to the particular purposes to which they might be put: 
 
C:        Annoyed I can't have any control over it. But then in the next breath I 
understand that change has to happen, but I don't always think it happens 
for the right reasons. I think medicine is the right reason. I think productivity 
levels, to increase consumer power, to increase profit, are not. Not when it 
means injecting sheep and getting different kinds of milk from them . .. 
(Lancashire Working Women group) 
 
B:         (Looking at a picture) . . . struggling up a path to the bright sunlight ahead 
and that's what I feel we're doing at the moment. We're struggling through a 
path of tangled weeds and don't knows and worries and decisions and we 
don't know what we're going to find when we get to the end. 
Mod:   A good path or a bad path? 
B:        I think it's a rocky path. 
(Lancashire Churchgoers group) 
 
Such ambivalence recurred in a number of the groups. There was extensive and 
profound unease at the prospect of the imagined increased pervasiveness of GM 
foods. This was in 1996-97, when there had so far been little or no public 
discussion of the implications of GM crops in Britain. But at the same time there 
was little evidence of any reflex hostility to the technology, or of any wish to avoid 
engagement with the complexity of what was at stake. When seen in context, the 
unease that people expressed was seldom comprehensively dismissive. 
Interference with nature was acknowledged frequently to be a reality of human 
existence and development - but at the same time the reasons for and motives 
behind particular classes of such interference, and the terms on which it might be 
undertaken, demanded review and extreme caution: 
 
M:       ... there’s a saying that ‘if it isn't broke, don't bother trying to fix it’ — and 
there's nothing wrong with food as it is naturally except that it hasn't got a 
long shelf life. So really I can see pound signs all over that. . . that's all it's 
really to do with. 
(Lancashire Working Women group) 
 
P:        ... in a world where the population is expanding at a high rate you've got to, 
in all areas, be as efficient and use technology in the most efficient manner, 
and in this respect, although I'm not particularly happy perhaps with 
choosing that food myself, I think it's something which has to progress to 
help everybody, or at least to test whether or not the results would be 
beneficial to help everybody. 
(Lancashire Churchgoers group) 
 
H:        ... well the other one I suppose, in a sense it had a purpose behind it — it 
was going to help some one with a serious, hopefully serious, illness and 
there might possibly be an argument for it. But I don't think there's an 
argument for feeding an animal to make it grow more quickly... just so that 
we can kill them more quickly and eat them more quickly. I don't like that. 
That's immoral to me ... 
(Lancashire Churchgoers group) 
 
Such tentative and highly selective acknowledgement of possible benefits was 
tempered, repeatedly, by deep anxiety about the ill-defined prospect of potentially 
enormous adverse - and irreversible - consequences: 
 
S:        Once you've genetically engineered a pig, it's always going to stay 
genetically engineered. But how are you going to reverse it? 
R:         If you find out there's a problem in ten years . . . 
S:        You can't and it will go on for ever, not just for the near future. This is 
permanent, once you've genetically engineered something. I don't think it 
will alter naturally, although nature will probably take over at one time and 
cause a problem. 
R: Right, so if you tinker with something then ... 
S: It will be passed on to the future . . . 
Mod: It will be passed on? 
S:        It’s irreversible though isn’t it, with genetics I would imagine.  
(Lancashire ‘Risk Takers’ group) 
 
L:         ... I’m not in control of this. I have no control over this. It’s gonna happen 
and I can’t... you know . . . 
(Lancashire Working Women group) 
 
G:        They’re messing around with food. The next thing is going to be human 
beings . . . 
(Lancashire Churchgoers group) 
 
What theological significance might this have? We suggest that a fruitful approach 
is to explore what might be inferred ontologically about people’s various reactions, 
viewed from the perspective of Christian understandings of the human person and 
of human interdependence. 
 
Seen in this light, several points stand out. First, people appeared to be 
responding from within a sense of a given order - a natural order, the boundaries 
of which were felt to be challenged radically by the prospect and potentialities of 
genetic modification: fundamental categories in ‘nature’ were being threatened 
through human intervention, with unforeseeable potential consequences. 
 
Yet second, there was tacit acknowledgement that human beings might be 
justified in certain circumstances in creative interactions (interference) with such 
order. But this should only occur if the purposes were somehow the right ones - 
which appeared to mean, governed by genuine compassion and charity towards 
other beings. 
 
However, third, such a condition was felt unlikely to be met. There was a recurrent 
fatalism and cynicism about the prospect of modifying the momentum of GM 
developments, in order to respect 'moral boundaries and the true range of 
uncertainties. The supposed collusion of governments and interested corporations 
was seen as making the widespread introduction of GM products inevitable, with 
scientific reassurances operating, as in the recent BSE-CJD (mad cow disease) 
disaster, to reinforce such momentum, neglectful of possible as yet unidentified 
dangers. 
 
In our view, when combined, such findings suggest that at the core of the 
concerns emerging from the focus group discussions were issues about human 
responsibility and control, under conditions of fundamental - indeed, ontological -
uncertainty and ignorance. Whilst prepared to countenance the transcendence of 
‘natural’ boundaries for specified benign purposes through processes of genetic 
modification, people tended tacitly to dismiss the possibility that the appropriate 
surrounding conditions or safeguards could or would ever be achieved. One 
pointer to this in the focus groups was the recurrent and disturbing fatalism and 
sense of disablement pervading people's discussion of their own lack of agency in 
relation to the ways in which matters were now developing. Sometimes the 
resulting sense of impotence took a heightened, even poetic, form: 
 
S:        I started out not too bad when I had the discussion. I thought I’d have an 
open mind about it, but I’ve changed my mind. As soon as I saw that about 
the human gene, suddenly the enormity of it made me feel really awful. I got 
an awful feeling about it, because I thought it was something that ... I think 
we’re touching things that we don't realise and I think we're taking things 
out of the earth, and we're now trying to correct it by using things like 
genetic engineering, because mistakes were made. And I feel time's just 
ticking by and we don’t realise what's going to happen in the future. I think 
something terrible could happen. It's given me a bad feeling really. 
Mod:   So it's as if we’re trying to fix something which is mixed up with something 
... ? 
S:        Yes, because the earth hasn’t got what it used to have. We feel we have to 
put something back into the food to make it better, and maybe we're 
correcting things in the wrong way. I don’t know . . . 
T:         It’s a frightening thought to think that time’s ticking away though . . . 
S:         Yes. It’s something that I'd like to put at the back of my mind now. I 
wouldn't like to think about it again. I probably wouldn't — but when we talk 
about it, it does bring it to your mind. But then I'll probably put it to the back 
of my mind now . . . 
(Lancashire Working Women group) 
 
In the Uncertain World report, a key empirical finding concerned the stark contrast 
that emerged between the broad open-ended character of such concerns about 
GMOs on the part of lay people, and the narrowly constrained positivistic scope of 
the official regulatory frameworks of GM regulation in Britain.(12) Where people in 
the focus groups consistently highlighted their unease about broad trajectories of 
GM developments (Why was this being done? In whose interest? With what 
cumulative implications and as yet unknown consequences?), the panoply of 
official advisory committees and authorisation processes had a narrow one-
product-at-a-time evaluation focus, and avoided such wider questions. This, 
Uncertain World argued, amounted to ‘a de facto process of political denial, on a 
matter of substantial public importance’. And the subsequent 1999 GM brouhaha 
appears to have followed precisely the fault lines between these two contrasting 
representations of what was at stake.(13) 
 
In the context of the present paper, that same contrast between the two outlooks 
might fruitfully be represented as a conflict between two different implicit 
theologies of the person - between an ‘official’ picture which, through its normative 
insistence on the relevance for social decisions of only a restricted number of 
scientifically measurable parameters, implied one version of what were to 
berecognised as justified human concerns; and a ‘lay’ picture in which a far wider 
range of implications of GMOs pointed to deeper issues of human relationships 
with the natural order under real-world conditions of contemporary political 
economy. Alongside this tension there are clearly differences in the value being 
given to science. In the ‘official’ picture there is a positivistic view of science, that is 
it is deemed to be the only worthwhile source of knowledge. On the other hand, 
the ‘lay’ picture is more likely to view science in its context as a human endeavour. 
Yet it seems to us that contrasting views of science presuppose the implicit 
theologies of the person and that it is these differences that are of particular 
significance in interpretation of current events. 
 
Hence, we suggest that picturing the tensions in theological terms may yield a 
richer and more convincing account of the intensity of recent controversies in 
Britain than some of the accounts which have been offered so far - for example, 
that public ‘emotionalism’ and ‘irrationality’, fanned by an hysterical media, has 
overwhelmed the ‘objective’ scientific facts, or that environmental pressure groups 
have somehow directed public sensibilities in unprecedente^ effective fashion. 
Rather, it appears to us that the dominant UK approaches to GM food/crop 
promotion and regulation may have been insulting the self-understanding of 
‘ordinary people’ about matters of considerable existential moment to them - and 
that such experience may have been intensified by the chronic lack of any 
adequate public discourse or context in which such matters can be acknowledged 
adequately and given respectful shared public attention. 
 
In short, what has burst forth in recent GM events, we suggest, has been the long-
burgeoning crisis in societies like our own concerning conflicting representations of 
the human - of tensions between different tacit understandings of human essence, 
in a way that is inclusive of the relation between human beings and ‘nature’, and to 
one another. 
 
And it is only when considered through the conceptual resources of theology, 
deployed in new ways, that insights into such matters - of mounting social and 
political importance in increasingly technologically-driven democracies like our 
own - can begin to be generated. 
 
III. The Religious Debate 
So far, we have raised issues arising from the focus group research in Uncertain 
World, and suggested some fresh interpretative perspectives that explore implicit 
religious dimensions. But how far does our approach match the ‘official’ theological 
debate conducted by church groups, religious organisations and theologians? A 
comprehensive survey of the literature in this area is beyond the scope of this 
paper; even more so would it be to attempt to discuss the unofficial responses 
of the churches to genetic engineering of non-humans, which, in the case of the 
Church of England, for example, take the issue with much greater seriousness. 
Nonetheless, we can point to a number of trends.(14) 
 
First, certainly prior to the early 1990s in the Protestant Churches and even later in 
the Roman Catholic Church, there has been a strong emphasis in the religious 
interventions on potential impacts on human beings. The implicit (and even 
sometimes explicit) premise of this emphasis seems to be that the genetic 
modification of non-human animals and plants raises no fundamental ethical 
issues per se. The most clearly ethical responses, for example in the official 
booklets produced by the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, 
have concerned human genetic technology.(15) The World Council of Churches, 
similarly, has been primarily concerned with the possibility of manipulation of 
human life by geneticists and what this might mean for theology and ethics.(16) 
While at the popular level there has initially been fear, mistrust and suspicion of 
genetic engineering in the churches, the official position is more often positive. 
Dyson suggests that this is related to the number of participants who are also 
scientists.(17) 
 
Interventions that have addressed the issue of non-human genetic engineering 
prior to the 1990s have tended to suggest it is amenable to simple cost-benefit 
calculations concerning the impact on humans. Since the 1990s the Scottish and 
Methodist Churches have been particularly active in promoting a more rounded 
view of the ethical implications of non-human genetic engineering.(18) However, a 
view that is dismissive of the significance of the genetic engineering of non-
humans still persists in official documents. For example, even as late as 1998, in 
the Church of England response to the Nuffield consultation document on modified 
crops, the team, chaired by the scientist John Polkinghorne, found no real reason 
for concern about genetic modification of plants on theological or ethical 
grounds.(19) So far there has been no official Roman Catholic response to genetic 
engineering outside that of humans. However, Pope John Paul II has indicated 
positive approval of ‘beneficial applications in the field of animal and vegetable 
biology which can be useful in food production’.(20) Very recently the Pontifical 
Academy for Life produced a slim volume, published only in Italian, dealing with 
the religious implications of genetic engineering of non-humans. It appeared to be 
similarly positive in line with the earlier papal statement about the possible benefits 
of genetic engineering of animals and plants for humanity, with the caveat that 
environmental issues needed to be taken into account.(21) 
 
Second, the interventions have exhibited a second kind of narrowing, with a 
repeated tendency to reduce theological considerations to ‘ethics’. The recent 
impressive book Engineering Genesis by the Society, Religion and Technology 
project of the Church of Scotland does consider the non-human realm in some 
detail.(22) However, it focuses on ethical and social concerns, rather than on 
theological issues. Its approach seems to be an exploration of ethical dilemmas 
from a Christian perspective in the light of scientific facts, rather than a direct 
theological engagement with the significance of genetic modification or its 
associated human and social dynamics. 
 
Third, ‘ethics’ itself has tended to be interpreted so that consequential ethics is 
given priority over other ethical frameworks. For example, the submission of the 
Church of England to the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee’s Inquiry into Human Genetics welcomed genetic engineering where it 
led to improvement of health or treatment of disease, but objected to it where it 
was used for more cosmetic purposes.(23) John Williams has argued that, in 
those cases where a deontological ethics is the dominant stance amongst 
religious groups dealing with public policy issues, such an approach will not be 
heard in the public domain, as secular language is primarily consequential.(24) 
Michael Banner, similarly, has observed that ethical debates on regulatory 
committees are all too often drawn to a narrow consequentialism.(25) Engineering 
Genesis can be welcomed for including a spectrum of ethical positions - but here, 
too, the consequential approach seems to dominate. In their research they found 
relatively few cases of intrinsic objections to genetic engineering of non-humans. 
 
Fourth, stances taken toward genetic engineering within the debate in the 
Churches have tended to be polarised between hostility and resistance at one 
end, associated with a more popular response, and the gradual acceptance or 
even growing enthusiasm at the other, associated with more official 
statements.(26) While the Society, Religion and Technology project quite 
deliberately takes a mediatory view in the case of genetic engineering of non-
humans and promotes this in the Churches at the official and popular level, we 
suggest that a measure of tension still exists that reflects the tension we discussed 
earlier between lay and official secular statements. The more hostile responses 
may be associated with a general suspicion of science and in some cases are 
undergirded by a reassertion of more traditional theological positions, but this is 
not always the case. For example, radical eco-feminist approaches to the 
relationship between God, humanity and the natural world lend themselves to a 
critique of science, and at least indirectly to all aspects of genetic engineering. In 
Norway, for example, new groups are developing that search for critical feminist 
approaches to biotechnology that includes the genetic engineering of non-humans 
and its impact on the environment.(27) More accommodating or accepting 
responses for the case of human genetic engineering often draw on traditional 
Christian notions of stewardship, or even claim that genetic engineering can allow 
us to become created co-creators with God. While the context of the discussions 
about humanity as creating with God are primarily the genetic manipulation of 
humans, this is then extrapolated to include ideas such as the redemption of 
nature as such.(28) 
 
Fifth, up to the early 1990s there has been a shift in official responses of the 
Church to a more positive stance towards genetic engineering, where as we noted 
earlier the discussion was primarily around the genetic engineering of humans 
(including the proviso that human greed and irresponsibility needs to be 
checked).(29) A relatively positive stance seems to have been retained and 
persisted in many of the later official statements about genetic engineering of non-
humans, as we noted earlier. There may be parallels here with the religious shifts 
that occurred at the time of the industrial and mercantile revolution at the end of 
the seventeenth century. The Church's original position was to condemn the 
market and human greed. However, there were increasing moves amongst certain 
Puritan divines towards a position that sanctioned and celebrated economic 
individualism itself as a divine calling.(30) Notions of humans becoming co-
creators with God through genetic engineering appear to echo this response. 
 
Thus what seems to be lacking overall is a specific theology which takes account 
of the profound challenges to human beings' self-image, and to their relationships 
with one another and with the natural world, that are posed by the new genetic 
technologies.(31) The focus on nature through notions of stewardship or trends to 
see humans as created co-creators with God appear to be ignoring the 
ambiguities of response of the kind which have surfaced in the focus groups and 
the implications of scientific uncertainty and ignorance for truly shared 
responsibility.  
 
Eco-feminism has pointed to the distortion in the human relationship with the 
natural world, but has not considered adequately the shifts in human identity 
through genetic engineering; the latter is rather castigated along with the rest of 
male-dominated science. Pointers to the ways in which the insights from focus 
groups might create a map for richer theological approaches are proposed in the 
section that follows. 
 
IV. A Genetically Modified Theology? 
We have argued above that the examination of lay speech about agricultural 
biotechnology reveals a deep sense that biotechnology is challenging people's 
sense of existential order, as well as society’s capacity for shared responsibility. 
We want to suggest that theological perspectives can help us better understand 
the character and significance of these public anxieties - and also that listening 
sensitively to lay discourse can assist theology, by offering clues towards a 
different kind of theological response to the issues thrown up by biotechnology. 
 
The members of the public who took part in the Uncertain World focus groups 
seemed to have a profound sense both of mystery about the character of the 
universe, and of the essential openness of nature. This sense seemed profoundly 
at odds with the sense of certainty with which government regulators seemed to 
be handling biotechnology at the time that the discussions were held in late 1996. 
Both the consequentialist language and reductionist evaluative framework 
embodied in the regulatory processes, and the deonto-logical ethics that often 
comes more easily to the Churches, seem inadequate responses in the context of 
these ambiguities. A consequentialist approach to ethics seems unsatisfactory for 
reflection on the new biotechnologies, not least because of the unknown extent of 
the uncertainties involved in their diffusion. However, the deontological ethics that 
has been favoured by some church groups is unhelpful either as it speaks a 
language that often seems disconnected with the secular ethical debate and is 
unlikely to be heard outside the Churches. 
 
Perhaps a more promising ethical vocabulary for the present situation may lie in 
the Wisdom tradition in Jewish and Christian theology. In situations of rapid 
change and radical uncertainty ethics arguably needs to be carried out in a way 
that relies less on abstract rules or on knowledge of outcomes, and more on 
insights arising from the cultivation of character, virtue and judgment. Wisdom 
signifies discernment, the ability to choose when confronted by a plurality of 
different factors. The wise person chooses not as an isolated individual, but as a 
person in community with God, neighbour and the natural world. Those who 
develop the virtue of wisdom re-examine such a wider sense of self and discern 
how it might be expressed through particular actions in the human and non-human 
community of which they are a part. Furthermore, wisdom in the theological sense 
includes the idea of goodness, that any action is one of righteousness before 
God.(32) Wisdom is not so much truncated knowledge-as-information, but the 
ability to embrace all perspectives and to integrate them. An ethic of wisdom flows 
from this inner transformation of the person. While the ability to show wisdom has 
been analysed from a psychological perspective, it is essentially a theological 
concept. For example, Birren and Fisher suggest that ‘Just as the belief in an all-
knowing deity is widespread, there is implicit in our culture a conviction that 
something like wisdom exists’.(33) They suggest, further, that a fuller appreciation 
of wisdom ‘will help to develop useful tools to assist world and national leaders in 
the increasingly complex problems facing humanity’.(34) 
 
Just as lay discourse about biotechnology poses a challenge to our understanding 
of ‘ethics’, so it does to existing notions of ‘natural order’. In this regard, we would 
argue, the biotechnological revolution - and the challenges its handling poses both 
to human social relations and to human relations with the natural order - might 
also be seen as a revelation. The various reactions of Jewish theologians to the 
Holocaust may be instructive here. Many writers attempt to make sense of the 
Holocaust using existing theological understandings of God’s relation to God’s 
creatures, and to the Jewish people in particular. Eliezer Berkovitz, for example, 
argues that there was nothing in the sheer scale of the Holocaust that made it any 
more problematic than any other disaster in Jewish history for traditional 
understandings of a God who alternately hides His face and intervenes in 
history.(35) Other writers, by contrast, interpret the Holocaust as a novum, as a 
revelation after which everything has to be different. For Emil Fackenheim, the 
Holocaust as an event uniquely resists being seen as part of a cosmic plan; it is 
nothing more than a turning point in history, after which the maintenance of faith 
takes on a special significance as a militant resistance to evil.(36) Finally, a third 
set of responses invites us to see the Holocaust as a revelation not just in the 
sense of a break with the past, but as an event which sharply reveals what must 
always have been the case. Richard Rubenstein takes this route to argue for the 
radical conclusion that after the Holocaust the Jewish people should abandon any 
traditional notion of a benevolent, omnipotent deity altogether.(37) For Martin 
Buber, by contrast, the Holocaust demands from Jews a return to the funda-
mentals of their faith, in order to work back from them to a more adequate 
understanding of God.(38) 
 
We suggest that theology is faced by a comparable set of options in relation to 
biotechnology. In suggesting this we do not mean to liken genetic engineering to 
Nazism, nor GMOs to the victims of the Holocaust. We simply want to suggest that 
the options for theology in its response to the biotechnology revolution are formally 
similar to those of Jewish theologians after the Holocaust. First, theologians might 
take the position that theology can go on much as before, simply regarding genetic 
engineering as a new, additional domain about which they might be asked to make 
interpretative or ethical judgments. Second, they might understand it as ushering 
in a radically new situation - interpreted either as one of elevation of humans to 
being ‘created co-creators with God’, or as a situation of great potential evil - which 
demands of them a newly militant intervention in the public domain. Or third, they 
might see themselves as participants in a public debate about what truths this 
historically unprecedented event may be revealing about the nature of human 
existence in the world. 
 
It is at this third level of response, we would suggest, that the novel human 
dynamics of the new genetics appear to lie. In a number of ways they seem to 
point towards a kind of theological response that is anything but simpleminded. 
People, quite prudently, want to resist the enthusiastic rush to embrace the 
possibilities offered by these new technologies, but they are not closed to the use 
of the technologies themselves in principle. Indeed, their current hostility may be 
aimed less at the level of the specific technologies and their applications, and 
more at that of the model of the human person and the conception of humanity's 
place in the world implicit in the actions of the industry and its regulators. At the 
same time, people appear to want to hold on to some notion of order and of a limit 
to human interference — and yet seem surprisingly open to the idea that our 
specific understandings of cosmic order and of human identity and responsibility 
may be on the verge of change. Above all, the public seems to sense the very 
notion, let alone the practice, of genetic engineering as bringing with it profound 
and challenging questions about humanity’s place in the world. Yet people 
experience the institutions responsible for these technologies as apparently not 
recognising the existence of such questions at all. The conversation 
that we as a society need to have - and that the public seems to be demanding - is 
a theological one. The role of theologians must surely be to find a theology 
adequate to that task.(39) 
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